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Abstract 
Telecommunication reform, regulation and policies of various countries have been a subject of 
intense debate and analysis over the last decade or two. Almost all countries have embarked on 
some type of telecommunication reform with varied degrees of success and failures. Traditionally, 
the reason for the reform is solely placed on the inefficiencies of the incumbent national telecom 
provider. By applying the normative, rational-choice, historical and cultural-cognitive approaches in 
institutional theory, this study seeks to further explain the key factors that led to the Ghanaian 
telecom reform. And to assess the various exogenous and endogenous factors that interplayed to 
bring about the reform. And how various actors reacted to the institutional changes involved in the 
reform process. A combination of review of secondary data and empirical data from interviews were 
used in the analysis. The product of this study was a description of the reason and effect of this 
phenomenal institutional change on the telecommunication industry of Ghana.  
Introduction 
Telecommunication reform, regulation and policies of various countries have been a subject of 
intense debate and analysis over the last decade or two. The 1990s saw global pursuant of telecom 
liberalisation and regulatory reform that was unparallel to any technological led reform since the 
beginning of the century and Ghana was no exception. An analysis of a number of World Bank 
reports and literature on telecom reform of the emerging economies depicts a high degree of global 
regulatory convergence, which meant that countries invited competition and reduced state 
intervention in managing their telecommunication sector. The two critical outputs in the 
telecommunication reform were competition which is safeguarded by regulation through the 
creation of a regulator.   
The process of telecommunication reform often started with corporatization through privatization to 
total liberalisation involving competition. There are a number of factors that have been attributed to 
why the telecom reform started in most countries. Researchers like Cowhey (1990, 1999) argued 
that it could be attributed to a “revolution in telecommunication technology”, whilst others argue 
that the performance of the incumbent was not the key driver for the telecom reforms. Samarajiva 
(2000), in his study of the telecommunication reform in Sri Lanka identified three key reasons for the 
telecom reform in Sri Lanka: World Bank and other international community’s influence; influence of 
the colonial master, the U.K. and lastly itinerant experts who share certain view of the world. Also, 
Pisciotta (1999) posits that the key drivers for the telecom reform were technological change and 
urgency need to attract financial investment in this sector. Whereas the technology change 
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argument can be to some extent supported, the telecom reform actually started before the need for 
financial investment became crucial.   
Furthermore, Cowhey and Klimenko (2000) posits that the WTO Uruguay Round which ended in 
1993 was a major influence in the telecom reform of the developing countries. Whilst some consider 
endogenous (internal) institutional factors like poor economic situation, Foreign Private Investment 
(FPI) attraction and the existing political system (Haggarty et al, 2002). Furthermore, the inefficiency 
of the monopoly operator has been highlighted by most scholars as the main motivation for the 
reform (Melody, 1997).  
Specifically to Ghana, some account of how the telecom reform unfolded has been documented in 
literature (Frempong and Anders, 2005; Haggarty et al, 2002; Ahator, 2004; Frempong and Atubra, 
2001). Haggarty et al (2002)’s report goes further to describe in some details the institutional factors 
that contributed or enabled the government to make the change. However, there is a need to apply 
institutional theory approaches to explain extensively how institutional values, structures and 
powers interplayed in the creation of the reform, the reform process and the reform output through 
national policy decision-making.  
Drawing on institutional theory this study seeks to provide a detailed account on how the 
liberalisation and privatisation process affected various actors and structures within the existing 
national institutions in Ghana. With the exception of Haggarty et al (2002) report most of the 
literature on Ghana’s telecom reform concentrates on how the reform took place with little 
emphasis on why it happened and the reactions of the actors in the national institutions. The 
significant questions that this paper seeks to answer by applying the institutional approach are: why 
(and how) market liberalization and regulatory reforms in the Ghanaian telecommunications 
industry happened? Are there any resistance from the existing telecommunication service 
providers? If so, how and if not, why? How do the major actors in making telecommunications policy 
react to the changing world environment, with what ideas and interests in mind? In seeking answers 
to these questions, we analysed secondary data on the Ghanaian Telecommunication Reform, and 
applied the historical and cultural cognitive institutional theory approaches and Koppenjan and 
Groenewegen (2005)’s four-layer model for institutional analysis, to analyse how the institutional 
structures and values interplayed to bring about this great telecom policy change in Ghana. We also 
interviewed key personalities during the reform era to assess their understanding on the factors that 
led to the reform.    
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section will describe the conceptual framework, 
introducing institutional theory, its approaches and the four-layer model, that will be followed by 
the Ghanaian telecommunication overview and then the Discussions and finally a conclusion and 
policy recommendations.  
 
The Conceptual Framework 
The use of institutional theory in research as a tool for explaining political and social phenomenon 
cannot be overemphasised. From the development of government policies (Strang, 1990; Zhou, 
1993) and an investigation to personnel policies (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Baron et al, 1986) to 
explaining economic policies (Thatcher, 1999; Schneider and Tenbucken, 2003), institutional 
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approached has been applied to seek understanding into these phenomena. Braathen also used an 
institutional approach to the study of telecommunication reform and policy development in 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Braathen, 2004). In his paper he used institutional factors to explain 
the reason why Mozambiques reform agenda is way ahead of that of Zimbabwe. However the 
approaches and concepts used in institutional studies are not properly structured (Clegg and Hardy, 
1999; Searle, 2005). By using institutional analysis, we are able to assess how formal and informal 
arrangements shape political interactions and influence the outcome of government actions 
(Leparrouza, 2008).  
Lieberman (2001) defines Institutions as the formal organizations and the informal but widely 
accepted rules of conduct that structure a decision-making or political process. An institution is 
made up of people and institutions that interplay to affect powers of groups, shape ideas, and 
influence public decisions and policy coordination (Scott, 2004). In a way, they can be described as a 
product of social interactions among people. As posit by North (1990) “institutions reduces 
uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life”. It provides the rules and norms that govern its 
actors who in turn influence how the institutional framework evolves. They provide a structure 
within which institutional actors can determine the outcome of their actions (North, 1986). The 
institutional forces shape the organisational system of its actors. By this, Scott (2001) stressed that 
institutions are in many ways made up of “cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements 
that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”. 
Thus, the institutional approach is based on these fundamental concepts. The level of emphasis on 
these concepts varies from one institutional scholar to the other, but there are some common 
themes that they will mostly agree with.  
The first concept is described as normative approach. This approach argues that an understanding 
into the actions of the actors of an institution can be attained by assessing the “logic of 
appropriativeness” that they acquire from the institution. The institutional actors are shaped by 
their environment. And the institutional environments can be differentiated by its rules and norms 
and that in turn differentiate its actors.  This is sometimes referred to as the socialist institutionalism 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996). Second, the rational choice institutionalism (also referred to as regulative 
institutionalism) emphasises that actors of an institution have their own preferences outside the 
institution that they are part of, and that their behaviour is focused on maximising their utility 
(Peters, 2000). However, they realise the need for the institution in order to achieve their goals.  
Thirdly, the historical institutionalism is based on the “path dependence” effect of institutions 
concept. This approach implies that decisions, structures and policies that are established at the 
inception of an institution will have a persistent influence over its behaviour throughout its existence 
(Skocpol, 1973). Lieberman (2001) posits that a central goal of most historical institutional analysis is 
to estimate the impact of variations in institutional forms and configurations on a particular 
outcome or set of outcomes. It is historical because analysts argue that once constructed at a 
moment in history, institutions typically endure for significant periods of time, influencing political 
dynamics and associated outcomes in subsequent periods. Therefore to understand why a national 
institution moves from its institutional form, there is a need to assess the policy-making process 
which formed it in the first place.  
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New institutionalism adds a new dimension to the institutional theory – cultural-cognitive approach. 
This approach posits that the actions of individuals are not based on rules or obligations (as in 
normative approach) instead they are based on conceptions. The fear of punishment or obligations 
does not affect or determine the actions of the actors in an institution. Instead, they act because 
they cannot see any other way of doing things. DiMaggio’s article on culture and cognition is seen 
has one of the new institutionalism articles that define this approach (DiMaggio, 1997). The culture 
of “saa na yeye no”1 meaning “that’s how it’s always done” is very familiar with the Ghanaian.  
At this point we will like to admit that there are more approaches and further variations in the 
concepts of institutional theory. However, the interactions between these concepts can be used to 
seek an explanation to the subject matter. Although, from the surface these approaches seem to be 
totally distinct, there is some unification that can be drawn from them and applied to the subject at 
hand. Firstly, the normative, rational choice and history have structure as a common denominator 
(Peters, 2000). In the normative approach, actors are influenced by the institution meaning the 
structures of institutions work to stabilise social behaviour. The institutional actor in the rational 
choice approach also relies on the values in the institutional structures to achieve its individual 
preferences. However, these structures are not built in a monolithic institutional environment which 
means that structures are sometimes weakened and certain suppressed groups and interest may 
succeed in infiltrating with new values (Scott, 2004).  
Conceptualising Institutional Change 
Institutional change can be explained by looking at organizations process of institutionalization. 
Institutionalisation is the process that the organizations obtain value and structures. For example, a 
newly established agency in a government ministry will be deemed to be less institutionalized than a 
well established department. An Organisation develops these values and structures through its 
interaction with the society and thus an institution can be said to be a variable not a constant and 
that different organizations are at different levels of institutionalization (Peters, 2000). As a variable 
therefore, a set criteria is needed to effectively assess the level of institutionalization of an 
organization.  Huntington (1965) posits that the level of institutionalization of any organisation can 
be measured by autonomous, adaptability, complexity and coherence. These can be used to assess 
how institutionalized a particular organization is.  
These four aspects can be used in measuring the level of institutionalization an organization is at; 
Below is a brief explanation of each: 
Adaptability is a function of an institution’s environmental challenges and age. An organization can 
be said to be highly adaptable by the more environmental challenges it has overcome and how long 
it has been in existence. However, age as function needs to be tempered with how dynamic the 
institution is. An older institution in a static environment can be less adaptable than a dynamic 
young institution. However, in general, the younger an organization, the more rigid it is. By holding 
the environmental changes constant, Huntington suggests that adaptability can be measured by the 
age of the organization. Also, adaptability can be measured in terms of an organization’s functions 
(Huntington, 1965). An organization is said to be more institutionalized if it has adopted one or more 
functions other than its primary function.  
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Autonomy represents the independence of the organization. How the organization is able to make 
its own decision outside its societal or political influence. A more institutionalized organization is 
determined by how independent it is in decision making. This can be measured in terms of budgets, 
appointments of management and autonomous sources of revenue (peters, 2000).  
Complexity demonstrates the capability of the organization to manage diversity in terms of products 
and functions. The more complex an organization, the more institutionalized. Modernisation is likely 
to destroy a simply monotonous organization than it is able to destroy a highly diversified 
organization. And it can be measured by the diversity of subunits and functions within an institution.  
Also, according to Huntington, the more coherent an organization is the more institutionalized. 
Coherence can be measured by the cleavages between members of the institution and its 
leadership. It can be assessed by the level of loyalty of the members to the institute.   
Objectives and Research Questions 
This study seeks to provide a further understanding and explanation on how institutional factors 
(exogenous and endogenous factors) have affected the reform of telecommunication in Ghana and 
to what extent various actors has progressed or hindered the reform agenda. Furthermore, it will 
seek to analyse the development of the regulator – National Communication Authority (NCA) and 
measure its institutionalization. It also seeks an explanation into the changing institution of the 
telecom regulator in the face of convergence in the context of Ghana. The research questions are 
thus formulated below: 
 The causes of institutional change: What were the exogenous shocks and endogenous 
processes in bringing about telecommunication reform in Ghana, and which institutional 
factors were more important in achieving the reform?  
 The process of institutional change: Ghana’s journey to telecom reform, under what 
circumstances is change deliberate or spontaneous, sudden or gradual, a cooperative 
venture or an outcome of conflict?  
 The outcome of institutional change: how efficient has the NCA as an institution been in the 
delivery of its institutional mandate? 
 
For the purpose of examining the telecommunication reform in Ghana, I will adopt the historical 
institutionalism and the cultural-cognitive approaches. By adopting this approach, factors such as 
national cultural practices and structures, political leadership, institutional isomorphism and the 
central institutional context are all considered. Thus, I will seek to explain why the existing weak 
political system in Ghana during the period to the reform should be considered as the main factor 
but not the popular belief of the inefficiencies of the monopoly. And that the other endogenous and 
exogenous institutional factors contributed to the need for the reform.  
Ghana Telecom Reform: Overview 
The Ghanaian telecommunication reform has been documented in a number of scholarly study since 
the late 1990s (Frempong and Atubra, 2001 Haggarty et al, 2002; Frempong and Henten, 2005; 
Frempong, 2008). Through a critical analysis of these studies we would like to present a brief 
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overview of the reform in three phases: Pre- reform; The Telecom Reform Process; and The 
Regulator).  
Pre-Reform  
Before the early 1990s when the main telecommunication reform started in Ghana, there were a 
number of significant projects which were earmarked to improve the operations of the incumbent 
GP&T and also to introduce competition into the sector. In 1975, GP&T started a series of projects 
known collectively as the First Telecommunication Project (FTP) which aimed at rehabilitation, 
modernization and expansion of Ghana s national telecommunication network (Allotey and Akorli, 
1996). The project which was sponsored by the Government of Ghana (GoG) and some international 
donor agencies from Canada, Japan and the Africa Development Bank totalled $76million and was 
planned to last from 1975 to 1979.  The FTP was delayed as a result of changes in government, 
economic recession, and other social factors, it was eventually completed in 1985. There were 
marginal accomplishments from this project.  
 
A Second Telecommunication Project (STP) with an eight years plan was initiated in 1987. The 
project aimed to modernize much of the existing network and to expand network capacity from 
56,000 lines to 76,000 lines. Some of the objectives were achieved, with the installation of a new 
international telephone exchange, the rehabilitation of the satellite earth station for international 
service and rehabilitation of various exchanges and external cable network (World Bank, 1995). The 
STP was funded by the World Bank, GoG and some donor agencies. The table below shows the 
distribution of contributions: 
 
Source  Foreign  
(millions of US$)  
Local (millions 
of US$)  
Total (millions 
of US$)  
Government of Ghana  1.5  9.8  11.3  
CCCE (France)  21.7  -  21.7  
Holland (NKF)  18.8  -  18.8  
Japanese grant/JICA  9.2  -  9.2  
Japan (EXIM)  7.0  -  7.0  
Japan (OECF)  69.5  6.7  76.2  
Ireland  1.7  -  1.7  
IDA  18.3  0.7  19.0  
Post and 
Telecommunication  
2.3  5.5  7.8  
T o t a l  150.0  22.7  172.7  
Adapted from: Allotey and Akorli (1996) 
During the same period the Government of Ghana (GoG) through the Ministry of Transport and 
communication (MoTC) introduced the Accelerated Development Program (ADP) for the telecom 
sector. ADP was for the period between 1994 and 2000. ADP was created with the assumption that 
competition is needed for improved access, reliability and quality of service (Frempong and Atubra, 
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2001). This conviction in competition was later reflected in the National Telecommunication Policy 
of Ghana, 2005 which states: 
 “the interest of consumers and business in Ghana to achieve optimum access to the 
best quality and most cost effective telecommunication services will be 
accomplished through the wisdom and incentives of the competitive market” 
(Telecom Policy, 2005) 
Meanwhile, before the ADP, in 1992 the government under the administration of the Ghana 
Frequency Regulation and Control Board (GFRCB) had issued licenses for the establishment of 
cellular providers in the country. And by 1996, Ghana had three mobile phone operators – Mobitel 
(1992-1993), Celltel (1995) and Spacefon (1996) established and providing mobile services (Haggarty 
et al, 2002).  
Identical to most monopolistic National Telecommunication Providers, Ghana Post and 
Telecommunication (GP&T) was at its worst position by the end of the 1980s with only 3 phones per 
1000 inhabitants with a distribution skewed towards those leaving in Accra (the capital) and other 
urban areas (Ahator, 2004).  Most of the district centres were not connected and the Northern part 
of the country which accounts for 30% of the inhabitants only had 1% of the total number of phones 
(Haggarty el al, 2002). As stressed by Haggarty et al (2002) the telecom sector at that time was 
characterised by poor management and inefficiencies.  
The structure of GP&T meant reduced responsibility and accountability on the part of the 
management of GP&T (Haggarty, 2002). The powers and individual interest of the institutions 
involve interplayed to some extent in making the management of GP&T inefficient.  
An executive of the erstwhile GP&T interviewed during this study insisted that the management of 
GP&T were very efficient and that what is described as inefficiency of the organization would be 
better put as the manipulations of government. He went on to stress that, ministers and senior 
managers of the ministry were micro managing the activities of the organization. “GP&T was seen by 
the government in power as a cash cow”, he added. In that the government uses the revenue from 
the organization to finance other projects without investing in the infrastructure. To gain support for 
the reform, certain operations of the organization was intentionally stalled increasing the 
inefficiency of the organization. From the cultural-cognitive perspective, since the establishment of 
the organization in the colonial era, the structures had not been modified in anyway. The 
institutional structures were as laid down by the colonial masters making reform and significant 
changes almost impossible.  
Reform Process 
In the early 1990s divergent models of telecom reform process emerged, mostly tailored around 
that of the developed world. Even though there are some similarities of the ultimate outcome of the 
process, the actual circumstances between the developed countries and the developing countries 
scenarios make it difficult for any meaningful comparison (Sanatan & Melody, 1997). However, there 
are some basic elements that seem to have been featured in both the developed and developing 
countries reform processes. In Ghana the telecom process could be said to have started with the 
launch of the Accelerated Development Program (ADP) for the telecommunication sector in 1994 
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(Ahator, 2004). The program was developed after an extensive consultation with telecom service 
providers, policy makers, financiers, donors, users and consultants (Anderson Management 
International) (Haggarty et al, 2002). It set out to revamp and revitalize the telecom sector through 
the introduction of competition and to attract new investments both foreign and local with an 
objective of Ghana becoming the gateway to West Africa.  
The ADP is the program which set out the policy objectives for the telecommunication reform in 
Ghana. The program stressed on the need for competition to ensure reliability, quality of service and 
price reduction. It also emphasized the need of a national single regulator. It identified the following 
specific objective items: 
 Achieving a density between 1.5 and 2.5 lines per 100 people;  
 Competition in the sector by introducing a second network operator 
 Improving public access in rural and urban areas, through the provision of payphone 
facilities (public and private);  
 Expanding the coverage of mobile services;  
 Liberalisation of value added services 
 Promoting Ghanaian ownership and control of telecommunications companies; and  
 Retaining an overall public regulatory control of the sector through the creation of a single 
agency: the National Communications Authority (NCA).  
To achieve the above mentioned objectives ADP adopted the following strategies: the authorisation 
of two national network operators: Ghana Telecom and a new independent operator; support of 
new financing: arrangements which promote investment in new telecommunications infrastructure 
throughout the country; and the privatisation of Ghana Telecom through the sale of a strategic stake 
to an international operating company combined with measures to broaden share ownership in 
Ghana. 
The second significant step in the Ghanaian telecom reform process was the incorporation of Ghana 
Telecom as a public limited liability company in 1995, separated for the Post. Melody (1997) posits 
that major restructuring of national public telecom operators through corporatisation and/or 
privatisation has brought about the essential change in focus to efficiency and customer service. And 
therefore Ghana Telecom’s corporatization was seen as a step in the right direction. The Posting 
aspect of the Ghana Post & Telecommunication also became Ghana Post.  
To introduce competition, the policy called for a second network operator (SNO) to create a 
duopoly, the privatization of the incumbent by selling 30% share through an international 
competitive bid and to set up a telecom regulator. The SNO like the Ghana Telecom was supposed to 
provide services both locally and internationally. The new SNO was also going to have a 20-year 
initial license. During the first five years, the two carriers were to be given nationwide exclusive 
rights over fixed line telecom services (Allotey and Akorli 1996).  The license for the operation of the 
SNO was auction at the same as the sale of 30% share of the incumbent (Ghana Telecom). A duopoly 
was created in December 1997 when Westel paid 10.5million U.S. dollars for the SNO licence. Also, 
the 30% sale of Ghana Telecom was completed with the Malaysian Telecom emerging as the winner. 
Reform Output - National Communication Authority 
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The establishment of the regulator is often seen as part of the telecom reform process. It is usually 
created to foster competition and protect the consumer and new entrants from the powers of the 
incumbent. As posit by Cave (2006); 
“ … regulators balance the interests of firms (dominant, fringe and potential), customers and societal 
stakeholders”. 
For example, in the Ghanaian telecom reform process, the SNO introduced has no existing market 
presence and customer base to compete with the incumbent. The regulator was established by the 
National Communication Act (NCA) of parliament Act.524 1996. As stressed earlier, it was 
established to provide controlled competition into the telecommunication industry (Alhassan, 2003).   
The NCA act defines the responsibilities of this regulatory body as: (i) setting technical standards; (ii) 
licensing service providers; (iii) providing guidelines on tariffs chargeable for services; (iv) monitoring 
the quality of service providers and initiate corrective action where necessary; (v) setting terms and 
guidelines for interconnections of the different networks; (vi) considering complaints from telecom 
users and taking corrective action where necessary; (vii) controlling the assignment and use of the 
radio frequency spectrum; (viii) resolving disputes between service providers and between service 
providers and customers; (ix) controlling the national numbering plan; (x) controlling the importation 
and use of types of communication equipment; and last but not the least, (xii) advising the minister 
of communications on policy formulation and development strategies of the communications 
industry (NCA Act, 1996).  
In 2004 a National Telecommunication Policy (NTP) was developed to provide a framework within 
which the sector will evolve. This policy document stipulates the government’s overall policy 
objectives for the telecommunication sector. Central to the objectives of the policy was to develop 
competition in the telecommunications sector while maintaining universal service provisions to 
protect vulnerable customers. The National Telecommunication Policy Objectives is further broken 
down into specifics as described below: 
 Universal access for all communities and population groups in Ghana to telephone, internet and 
multimedia services by the year 2010. 
 National penetration universal telecommunications service to reach 25% of the population, 
including at least 10% in rural areas, by the year 2010. 
 Connection of all schools, medical clinics, and Government offices and public and community 
broadcasting stations to advanced telecommunications services; 
 Fully open, private, and competitive markets for all telecommunications service 
 Streamlined, efficient, and effective regulation of the telecommunications industry on a fully 
transparent, technologically neutral, and competitively balanced basis 
 Affordable prices for telecommunications services, particularly for low income citizens 
 Profitable investment opportunities for businesses in all segments of the market 
 Ghana shall be seen as a first-class hub for international telecommunications and information 
industry investment, jobs, and development, and a leader in the transformation of Africa toward 
a full participation in the Information Society.  
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To achieve this central objectives the National Telecommunication Policy (National Telecom Policy, 
2004) in line with the NCA Act further simplies NCA functions and responsibilities as shown in figure 
1below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This roles and responsibilities identified are in line with the generally recommended core 
responsibilities of regulators used in the policy document of most countries. Apart from these core 
responsibilities other functional roles including establishment of standards, provision of advice to 
the Minister and the public education campaign are considered in the NTP.  
Reform Output - Increased Competition 
By the year 2001 the number of telecom providers providing mobile services in Ghana had risen to 4 
namely OneTouch (Ghana Telecom), Scancom Ltd, Kasapa, and Mobitel, with Ghana Telecom and 
Westel providing fixed line services. This was a major achievement in the young telecom reform 
history of Ghana. And by the end of 2009 has increased the number of mobile network providers to 
6 providing competitive pricing to their customers.  With a significant increase in the number of 
mobile service subscribers from meagre 2000 in 1994 to 15,504,612 in February 2010. However, this 
success story would not have been possible without the telecom regulator – National 
communication Authority. Fink et al (2002) in their analysis of 86 developing countries across Africa, 
the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean observed that improvement in performance of the 
telecom sector is maximised when privatization and competition is supported by an independent 
regulator (Fink et al, 2002). 
Discussions – The Institutional Analysis 
Though telecommunication reforms are commonly found in many countries, the processes and 
outcomes of the reform are not the same at all. There are basic factors that can cause national 
NCA 
Competition 
Licensing Facility Sharing 
Universal Access 
Spectrum Management 
Consumer 
Protection 
Tariffs 
National Telecommunication 
Policy 
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differences and some of this will be explained below using the Koppenjan and Groenewegen 
(2005)’s four-layer model.  
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Koppenjan and Groenewegen, 2005 
 
The four-layer model which has its roots in Williamson’s transactional cost economics (Koppenjan 
and Groenewegen, 2005) is relevant for this analysis because it provides a layered approach to 
analysing institutions. It distinguishes the different kinds of institutions involved in the reform at the 
various levels of the model. It also depicts the interaction between the institutions of the layers 
involved. The 1990s saw global pursuant of telecommunication liberalization, privatisation and 
regulatory reform that was unparallel in the history of the utility sectors and has Ghana was no 
exception. Though it was argued that the world was moving towards a regulatory convergence 
through privatization and similar telecom regulatory policies, the ways and means of achieving their 
goal varied according to the structures and institutions of individual countries (Hong, 1998). Also, 
adopting the historical institutionalism approach, the success of the reform of any individual country 
can be traced to its policy development process. The import of this section of the study is to analyse 
the institutional factors and actors that interacted in the Ghanaian telecom reform process. Why 
(and how) the Ghanaian telecommunication reform? Was there any resistance either from existing 
telecommunication institution or interest groups? It is argued that the nature of national institutions 
determines a country’s redistribution of property rights in the process of reform. As posit by 
Thatcher below: 
Layer 1: Actors/Agents in a Socio-technological System; Interaction 
between actors and agents aimed at creating and influencing provision of 
services.  
Layer 2: Formal and Informal Institutional Arrangements; 
corporatisation, agreements, arrangements 
Layer 3: Formal Institutional Environment; Formal rules, laws and 
regulations 
Layer 4: Informal institutional environment; culture, norms, values 
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“National Institutions are important for the starting point of reform. Policy 
modifications in a country are related to past circumstances, notably the 
institutional framework, which influence the actors involved in reform, their aims 
and ideas, and the distribution of resources and power amongst them.”(Thatcher, 
1999) 
There are three key inferences that can be drawn from Thatcher’s statement: reform can result from 
changes in the policies that guides the operations of a national institution; from changing the 
institution entirely; or by changing the power play that may influence exogenous factors that will 
intend affect the reform. Thus, a critical analysis of the process and scope of telecom reform in 
Ghana will require an understanding of the institutions and structures of Ghana’s political economy 
regarding the telecommunication sector. 
Layer 1 – Actors, Agents and Games 
The key actors and agents identified in the Ghanaian telecom reform were; World Bank, WTO, 
British Government (Colonial Masters), Government of Ghana, GP&T Management, Ghanaian public, 
Western Wireless, and GP&T employees. The interaction between these actors and agents 
determined the reform process and affected the nature and output of the reform.  
The World Bank as a major financier of GP&T’s capital expenditures was interested in the 
privatization of the GP&T because officially, it saw telecom liberalization as a catalyst for economic 
growth and increased in GDP (Mustafa et al, 1997). However, the perception of the key people 
interviewed as part of this study was that the World Bank’s interest was suspicious. When asked 
“what role and influence did the World Bank have on the Ghanaian reform process, a former board 
member of GP&T answered that, the whole process was forced on Ghana as part of the World 
Bank’s economic restructuring program for Ghana. In his opinion, the agency was interested in 
opening up Ghana’s telecommunication industry for the Telecommunication giants of the developed 
world. He added that, the entire process was designed by the World Bank on the basis of 
contemporary European experience. He cited the internal structures of GP&T, Ghana’s young 
democracy and the lack of locally developed private sector as what he meant by wrong timing.  
The Government of Ghana (GoG) was a principal beneficiary of the telecom reform process. GoG 
effect on the telecommunication industry was exercise through the various arms of government 
notably MoTC, GFRCB, and the board of GP&T. Also, it was generally perceived by the interviewees 
that GP&T was micro managed by the government through the ministry. It was used to employ 
political activists and party foot soldiers which contributed to the most acclaimed inefficiencies of 
the management of GP&T. Furthermore, the government failed to invest in the infrastructure of 
GP&T whilst its income was used to finance other national projects.  
Furthermore, the inefficiency of the telecom sector was costing the government huge sums of 
dollars and threatens to derail it from its economic recovery agenda.  
In addition the workforce of the incumbent telecom operator (GP&T) was generally not influential in 
the reform process. When asked, how did the workforce of GP&T react to the reform process, a 
former worker and an executive member of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union 
responded, that the government had total control over the decisions of the union. And all efforts to 
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get the voice of the workforce to be heard proved futile. Key staff members were promised shares in 
the organizations whilst others were promised to keep their job. In all 474 workers were to be 
retrenched. Two strike attempts by the workers were also thwarted. He added that the inefficiencies 
of the organization had caused public resentment against its workers which meant that they had 
little support from the general public.  
¨The recession in 1980s meant that there was a huge migration outward. Teacher, Nurses and other 
professionals left the country for Europe and the United States. They enjoyed telecommunication 
services in those countries and when they return because of the civil rule demanded similar services 
from the local monopoly who could not offer. There was internal pressure from a section of the 
citizens for the GP&T to deliver. There was huge backlog of applications for telecom services. 
However, since there were a few people with telephone, there was less concern among the public 
on the effect of the sale on tariff (Haggerty et al, 2002). 
The above discussions depicts that a combination of poor performance by GP&T, strong government 
manipulations (without opposition in parliament), weak Workers’ Union and a general public apathy 
are the key endogenous factors that led to the Ghanaian Telecom Reform.  
Layer 2 – Formal and Informal Institutional Arrangements 
1992 saw Ghana moving to a constitutional government over a period of instabilities in military 
regimes. There was a need for the new civilian government to show some form of policy changes 
which are in harmony with international policies. Also, an initial Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAP) had not been successful in reforming the utility sector. Furthermore, the country was coming 
out of a great economic recession in the 1980s and need the reform to stimulate the economy. The 
government needed to assure investors of liberalization. The reform was introduced gradually when 
cellular entry was allowed in 1992. 
In the meantime, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) had initiated negotiations to liberalized the 
basic telecommunication market under the Uruguay Round discussions. In 1997, a new agreement 
which combines binding commitments on market access from its participants with a statement of 
“procompetitive regulatory principles” that have rapidly become the definition of the policy 
revolution under way in this market emerged (Cowey & Klimenko, 2005). Ghana was credited for 
being one of the few African countries to sign the Uruguay Round agreement in 1997. This shows 
that Ghana was committed to competition and meeting its World Trade Organisation obligations 
towards liberalisation of the sector straight from the beginning. It was believed that the import for 
the WTOs Uruguay Round was to open up the telecommunication industry of the developing 
countries for the companies in the developed economy.  
In 1995 Ghana Telecom was incorporated as a limited liability company separated from the postal 
services. And the same year witnessed the sale of the license for the Second Network Operator 
(SNO) to Western Wireless an American company.   
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Layer 3 – Formal Institutional Environment 
The inefficiencies of GP&T managment was compounded by the fact that the regulation of the 
sector was divided among conflicting agencies namely, the GP&T, MoTC, Ministry of Finance and 
GFRCB; all responsible for certain aspects of the firm (Haggarty et al, 2002).  
 
Key Regulatory Tasks and Regulators 
Regulatory Tasks Key Regulators 
Licenses:A. General 
                B. Frequency 
MoTC 
GFRCB 
Tariffs: A. Service Charge 
             B. Frequency Charge 
GP&T, MoTC 
GFRCB 
Allocation of number services GP&T, MoTC 
Frequency Regulation GFRBC 
Type Approval GP&T, GFRBC 
Interconnection Agreement MoTC, GP&T 
Arbitration  MoTC, GP&T 
International Regulatory 
cooperation 
MoTC, GP&T, GFRCB 
Legal Means of Enforcement MoTC, GP&T, GFRCB 
Advisory function vis a vis MoTC None/GP&T 
Adapted from Haggarty et al (2002) 
There were two Acts of Parliament involved in the Ghanaian telecom reform process. The 1995 Act 
which enabled the establishment of the Ghana Telecom as a private limited liability company 
separated from the postal section. And the December 1996 Act NCA 524 gave the regulator 
considerable autonomy and powers as described earlier. However, its total independence was 
impaired since the minister of communication has overall responsibilities over the operations of the 
regulator. Appeals against NCA decisions are made to the minister of communication before if not 
settled could appear at the high court. Our investigation reveals that the government had a hard 
time passing the bill to an Act. It had to appear twice in parliament before being passed. It was seen 
to be in conflict to Ghana’s 1992 Constitution which states; “There shall be no impediments to the 
establishment of private press or media; and in particular, there shall be no law requiring any person 
to obtain a license as a prerequisite to the establishment or operation of a newspaper, journal or 
other media for mass communication or information” (Constitution of Ghana, Chapter 12, article162 
Sect. 3). A Supreme Court decision in 1996 gave the government the right to regulate the radio 
spectrum.  
Layer 4 – Informal Institutional Environment 
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National telecom networks in developing countries are generally valued as symbols of national pride. 
In general, the main endogenous force against the privatization of GP&T was the public’s view of 
GP&T as a national asset. These observations hold true for both in the parliamentary debates about 
the law that deregulated telecom and the government's timid efforts to implement it. The fear of 
alienating the people and making them feel a sense of national loss may have accounted for why 
Ghana did not totally privatize, but rather opted for a regulated sector with controlled private sector 
participation. During the debates in 1994, a Member of Parliament posed a caution to the House 
that Ghana Telecom (GT) “is a symbol of national sovereignty and that any communication policy 
should aim at protecting it (Alhassan, 2003). Similar views were held by the populace about the 
privatization of the organization. Those interviewed as part of this study identified the above point 
as their main reason for being against the liberalization and privatization process. Some goes as far 
as seeing it as re-colonization of Ghana.  
 
Conclusion 
Management inefficiency of the monopolist national telecom provider is usually cited by scholars as 
the fundamental reason for the reform (Frempong & Atubra, 2001; Ahator, 2004; Haggarty et al, 
2002). Even though that might be one of the significant factors identified, there were some other 
pertinent factors that extends our understanding into why the government of Ghana engaged in 
telecom reform at that specific time. Whilst Haggarty et al et al, (2002) gives some account on the 
state of the incumbent which contributed to the reform.  
We identified the following as possible additional endogenous factors: the political economic 
situation; Migration; lack of institutional policies. And also exogenous institution factors like WTO 
agreement (Uruguay Round); USA Telecommunication Act 1996; Group on Basic Telecommunication 
1997; and attracting Foreign Private Investment (FPI). We also, found that the exogenous factors 
were far greater than previously noted in literature and that the World Bank, and WTO had far more 
influence on the reform than internal endogenous factors.  
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